When the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) approved the 800MW Rupsha Combined Cycle Power Plant in 2018, it was hailed as a milestone for Bangladesh’s energy sector.
With an estimated cost of Tk 8,498.65 crore and significant backing from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the project was expected to provide reliable electricity and support industrial growth. However, years later, the project has become a symbol of mismanagement, delays, and unfulfilled promises.
Of the total expenditure, ADB contributed Tk 5,987.87 crore, with the remaining funds sourced from the government and a controversial public-sector financing model.
Yet, despite the heavy investment, the project remains in limbo. Originally scheduled for completion by June 30, 2022, its deadline has been extended until June 30, 2025. The most pressing issue? A severe gas shortage that threatens to render the power plant ineffective.
In March 2024, under pressure from then-State Minister for Power and Energy Nasrul Hamid, authorities signed a Gas Supply Agreement (GSA).
However, industry experts immediately raised red flags—where would the required gas come from? The supply is not expected until 2027, meaning the plant is being commissioned without a sustainable energy source.
A Policy in Crisis: Poor Planning and Overcommitment
The lack of foresight in Bangladesh’s energy policies is evident in the Rupsha project. Power and Energy Adviser Dr. Fauzul Kabir Khan, during an inspection in August 2024, voiced his frustration over the project’s execution without a secured gas supply.
He instructed officials to find a temporary solution by rationing upstream gas, proposing that the plant be commissioned in November 2024 with 40mmcfd of natural gas.
Following his directive, the Power Division formed an inter-ministerial committee, which concluded that the plant could only operate 1-2 days per month.
The problem is clear: while the Rupsha plant is expected to generate 400MW during those operational days, it will simultaneously force shutdowns at other power stations, such as Sirajganj and Khulna, which together contribute 780MW to the grid. In essence, the Rupsha plant does not solve a power crisis—it shifts it elsewhere.
The Mounting Costs of Inaction
Every delay in project execution adds to its financial burden. The longer the plant remains idle, the higher its maintenance costs. BPDB estimates that an additional Tk 108 crore will be spent between February 22-28, 2025, to commission the plant, while another Tk 184 crore will be needed to sustain partial operations until December 2026. In total, taxpayers will bear an enormous financial load for a project that remains functionally redundant.
Compounding the issue is Bangladesh’s dwindling gas supply. Domestic production has fallen from 2,700-2,800mmcfd in 2017 to 2,100mmcfd today.
Even with supplementary LNG imports, total availability ranges between 2,700-3,000mmcfd—insufficient for national demand. Petrobangla had assured NWPGCL of LNG supply from 2020, but those assurances have proven hollow.
ADB’s Role: Due Diligence or Oversight?
The Asian Development Bank’s involvement in the Rupsha project is now under scrutiny. The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) has launched an investigation into why ADB approved funding despite clear red flags about gas shortages.
ADB’s feasibility studies projected a rate of return at 6.5%, but revised figures show inflated expectations between 12-18%, raising questions about financial integrity.
Power Division officials argue that the problem is not ADB’s fault but the government’s lack of strategic planning. One anonymous official described the project as an example of political decision-making overriding technical feasibility.
Is Gas Supply a Realistic Goal?
Petrobangla’s latest assessments suggest that meeting Rupsha’s 40mmcfd gas requirement would require rationing from other power plants in the southwest.
Even if gas is secured, another problem looms: EPC contractors are reluctant to implement preservation measures due to concerns over long-term plant degradation. The uncertainty over gas availability raises the risk of further financial losses.
Further complicating matters is a network of vested interests allegedly pushing the project for personal gain. These groups first implemented the Alenga-Bheramara gas pipeline, which failed to connect to the national grid.
They later attempted to secure gas via the Bangladesh-India pipeline and proposed the Payra regasification unit—both efforts collapsed. With no alternative solutions in sight, the financial burden continues to mount.
What Happens Next?
The most viable solution, according to BPDB, is to shift gas allocations from national reserves rather than power-sector allocations.
However, this creates another problem: it could trigger power shortages in other regions. Even if the plant is commissioned, it would only operate sporadically—providing no long-term solution to Bangladesh’s power needs.
During peak demand seasons, such as summer, Ramadan, and Boro irrigation, gas supply to Rupsha will be nearly impossible. Authorities are now considering running the plant only during national holidays to minimize disruption.
Meanwhile, NWPGCL has warned that without consistent gas supply, expensive preservation costs will become inevitable.
Government and Expert Reactions
Newly appointed Energy Secretary Mohammad Saiful Islam has stated that Petrobangla initially planned to supply gas via LNG from the Bhola gas field but abandoned the plan due to high costs.
He declined to comment on potential disciplinary actions against officials responsible for the misleading gas supply assurances.
Consumer Association of Bangladesh (CAB) Energy Adviser Prof. Shamsul Alam remains one of the project’s harshest critics.
“This is a textbook case of corruption-driven policymaking. The state must take a stand against this ‘Lootera’ model. Those responsible—from top to bottom—must be held accountable. Their assets should be confiscated.”
Prof. Alam has also called for a feasibility reassessment and recommended that Bangladesh refuse loan repayments to ADB, citing financial mismanagement and inflated return projections.
A Hard Lesson in Energy Policy
The Rupsha Power Plant highlights the dangers of poor planning, over commitment, and political maneuvering in Bangladesh’s energy sector. Instead of solving an energy crisis, the project has created new financial and logistical nightmares.
As the government grapples with growing public discontent, one question remains: will accountability measures be enforced, or will this become yet another case of unchecked waste?
